Current Affairs explainer · 12 September 2026 · IR coverage of India–Iran relations at BRICS

The news in one line: President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in New Delhi for the 18th BRICS Summit and held warm bilateral talks with PM Modi — Iran’s message at war’s edge: it “will not surrender” to US–Israel pressure, and “no country should disrupt trade.”

Why is Iran’s presence at this summit so charged?

Tehran arrives at this summit straight out of the region’s worst confrontation in decades — the June 2025 twelve-day war with Israel, American strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, and a still-simmering crisis over the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint through which a fifth of the world’s oil continues to transit. Iranian officials have spent the run-up declaring that Iran “will not surrender” to US–Israel “bullying,” while the threat of UN sanctions snapback and fresh strike-talk keeps escalation risk alive. Yet Pezeshkian’s tone in Delhi was deliberately moderate: he called his talks with Modi “very nice,” stressed centuries-old civilisational ties, and framed Iran’s BRICS message as fundamentally economic — trade must not be held hostage to anyone’s blockade. The contrast is the point, and examiners love it: Iran wants the world to see a state seeking partners, not war.

What does Iran want from India specifically?

Three asks, all economic at the core. Read them as a triad — examiners like to bundle Chabahar, INSTC and diplomatic signalling into a single statement-based question. Chabahar momentum: the port India built on Iran’s southeastern coast — with its 10-year operating agreement signed in May 2024 — is Iran’s biggest India-backed project and a sanctions-sensitive one; Tehran wants fuller utilisation and deeper Indian investment so the momentum continues instead of leaking away. INSTC vitality: the International North–South Transport Corridor, running via Chabahar/Bandar Abbas to Russia and Central Asia, is Iran’s pitch to be the transit spine of Eurasia — volumes through the corridor have grown sharply since 2022, and Tehran wants India to help convert that growth into permanence. Political cover: every major-power statement of engagement — especially from a country that simultaneously holds a US trade dialogue — dilutes Iran’s isolation, and Pezeshkian’s BRICS platform was built for exactly this. Delhi, in turn, repeated its consistent line: the Iran–US confrontation must de-escalate, and Gulf stability is existential for India’s economy — remember that linking phrase, because it is the most examined pair in this relationship.

How does India balance Iran against America, Israel and the Gulf?

This is the classic Indian diplomatic tightrope — and this single week displayed it in one city: the UAE Crown Prince and Iran’s President both in Delhi, Saudi participation in the summit hall, and an American trade war being managed in the background. India’s tools are separation and consistency: engage Iran on connectivity and civilisational culture, while keeping defence and intelligence ties with Israel and strategic energy ties with the Gulf wholly separate. Votes at the IAEA are calibrated, not moralised; public language stays fixed on de-escalation. Fix the exam formulation in your head: India treats Iran as a connectivity partner and a regional actor to be stabilised, not a client to be aligned with — a policy that has survived three Indian governments and two US administrations, which is exactly the kind of continuity fact examiners love to attach to a “analyse India’s Iran policy” question.

Why does Chabahar matter so much — and why is it fragile?

Chabahar’s Shahid Beheshti terminal is India’s only sea-land corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan entirely — this is precisely why India built the Zaranj–Delaram highway inside Afghanistan two decades ago: the road connects to the port, and the port completes the route. The 2024 10-year pact — with IPGL, an Indian company, operating the terminal — signalled long-term commitment despite US sanctions, resting on an American carve-out that Washington has kept alive for Afghan reconstruction logic. But understand the fragility before you memorise the opportunity, because examiners test both sides. Every escalation spike in US–Iran relations puts that carve-out in question; Iranian port politics and pricing disputes periodically slow expansion; and the INSTC’s rail gaps inside Iran — the Rasht–Astara stretch being the famous missing link — cap throughput. India’s answer has been patience plus small steps: clearer customs procedures, more rakes, more transit agreements with Central Asian states.

What is Iran actually saying at the summit itself?

Pezeshkian’s Delhi messages cluster on three themes — read them in order, because the third explains why the first two matter to India. Trade as a right: “no country should disrupt trade” — aimed squarely at American sanctions and blockade threats, and resonant inside a grouping of sanctioned and sanction-threatened economies. Resistance without surrender: the refusal to capitulate under military pressure, framed for domestic and BRICS audiences simultaneously. Membership solidarity: Iran — a BRICS full member since 2024 — presents the grouping as proof that Western primacy is negotiable. For India, the useful part is the first theme: the connectivity language aligns with India’s own INSTC interests. The delicate part is the second, where India wants de-escalation, not defiance, to win the day in Hormuz — expect examiners to probe exactly this tension.

The oil question nobody says out loud

Here is the question examiners will not phrase directly but will test anyway: why does India, Iran’s old second-largest crude supplier-market, import zero Iranian oil today? The anchor fact: India officially stopped importing Iranian crude in 2019 under US sanctions pressure — before that, Iran was regularly India’s second-largest supplier. Now read the arithmetic behind the silence. India buys discounted Russian crude at scale; diversified Gulf supply covers the rest; and restarting Iranian imports would collide head-on with sanctions enforcement precisely when India is negotiating trade terms with Washington. Iran, for its part, has redirected most exports to China. Any normalisation — should US–Iran talks ever produce one — would reopen the question instantly. Fix these three prelims anchors permanently: imports suspended in 2019; the “ship-to-ship” discounts era is over; Iranian crude now flows dominantly to China.

Rapid facts for prelims

India–Iran relations: rooted in civilisational ties; the strategic logic is Suez-free connectivity westward. Chabahar Port: located in southeast Iran on the Gulf of Oman — deliberately outside the Strait of Hormuz; India developed the Shahid Beheshti terminal; signed a 10-year agreement (May 2024) to operate the port; backed by a US sanctions carve-out. Zaranj–Delaram Highway: 218-km Indian-built highway in Afghanistan, linking Chabahar to Afghanistan’s Garland Highway. INSTC: 7,200-km multimodal corridor running Mumbai → Bandar Abbas → Caspian Sea → Russia/Central Asia; founded in 2000 by India, Iran and Russia. Rasht–Astara: the missing rail link that would complete the INSTC’s western branch. War of June 2025: the 12-day Israel–Iran conflict; US struck Iranian nuclear sites; a ceasefire has held since. Strait of Hormuz: ~20% of global oil transits through it — the chokepoint Chabahar sidesteps. Iran in BRICS: full member since January 2024. India’s Iranian crude: imports stopped in 2019 under US sanctions pressure.

Practice questions

1. Why is Chabahar strategically important to India? — It is India’s sea-land corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan entirely, anchored by the 10-year port operations agreement signed in 2024.
2. What is the INSTC’s founding triad, and which Indian port anchors its origin? — India–Iran–Russia, founded in 2000, with Mumbai as the originating port.
3. Which Indian-built highway connects Chabahar’s hinterland into Afghanistan? — The Zaranj–Delaram Highway (218 km), constructed by India.
4. When did India stop importing Iranian crude, and why? — In 2019, under US sanctions pressure following the withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal waivers.

The closing argument

The exam-ready synthesis: Pezeshkian in Delhi is Iran demonstrating it still has options, and India demonstrating it still has balance. India’s Iran policy has always been connectivity-first — ports, corridors, civilisational warmth — insulated as far as possible from both American sanctions and Iranian escalation. The war-shadowed present makes that insulation harder, not impossible, because every actor in the Gulf ultimately shares one Indian interest: open shipping lanes and lower oil prices. For your essay or Mains answer, anchor the closing paragraph here — balance without alliance, engagement without exposure. And when you track this relationship after the exam, watch Chabahar tonnage, not summit communiqués; the port is the relationship’s honest scoreboard.

Mains practice

1. “India’s Iran policy is connectivity in search of stability.” Examine in the light of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi. (GS-2)

Revision card

• Pezeshkian in Delhi: BRICS Summit, September 2026; Modi called the talks “very nice”; joint message — “no country should disrupt trade.”
• Backdrop: June 2025 Israel–Iran 12-day war; Strait of Hormuz crisis; Iran’s stand — “will not surrender.”
• Chabahar: 10-year agreement signed in 2024; includes a US sanctions carve-out; route bypasses Pakistan entirely.
• INSTC: Mumbai–Bandar Abbas–Caspian–Eurasia corridor; the Rasht–Astara stretch is the missing link.
• Crude: India’s imports suspended since 2019 under sanctions pressure; Iran’s exports are now China-led.

Sources

• Economic Times — BRICS live: Pezeshkian-Modi talks, summit day one
• NDTV — Iran: ties with India long-standing, historic
• Times of India — Pezeshkian visit amid Middle East tensions

Chabahar vs Gwadar: the comparison examiners love

Two ports roughly a hundred miles apart on the Makran coast tell opposite strategic stories. Chabahar — Indian-built and operated, sitting on the Gulf of Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz — is a connectivity asset: Afghanistan and Central Asia access, INSTC’s sea shoulder, and a sanctions-managed partnership under a US carve-out. Gwadar — Chinese-built and operated under CPEC — is a strategic asset: a maritime foothold near India’s western flank and the terminus of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, whose territory-linked projects India boycotts because the corridor crosses Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The exam formulation: Chabahar is India’s hedge against Karachi and Gwadar; Gwadar is China’s hedge against Malacca and the Indian Navy. A preliminary item often simply tests the pairing — Chabahar-India-INSTC, Gwadar-China-CPEC.

Related reading: Hormuz on the Boil: Iran, US Warships and the Risk of a Wider War

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