Current Affairs explainer · 12 September 2026 · IR coverage of India–Iran relations at BRICS

The news in one line: President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in New Delhi for the 18th BRICS Summit and held warm bilateral talks with PM Modi — Iran’s message at war’s edge: it “will not surrender” to US–Israel pressure, and “no country should disrupt trade.”

Why is Iran’s presence at this summit so charged?

Tehran lands in Delhi straight out of the region’s worst confrontation in decades — the June 2025 twelve-day war with Israel, American strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, and a simmering crisis over the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil still transits. Iranian officials have spent the run-up declaring that Iran “will not surrender” to US–Israel “bullying,” while UN sanctions snapback dynamics and strikes-talk keep escalation risk alive. Yet Pezeshkian’s Delhi tone was deliberately moderate: praising his talks with Modi as “very nice,” stressing centuries-old civilisational ties, and framing Iran’s BRICS message as economic — trade must not be held hostage to anyone’s blockade. The contrast is the point: Iran wants the world to see a state seeking partners, not war.

What does Iran want from India specifically?

Three things, all economic at the core. Chabahar momentum: the port India built on Iran’s southeastern coast — and its 10-year operating agreement signed in May 2024 — is Iran’s biggest India-backed project and a sanctions-sensitive one; Tehran wants fuller utilisation and investment. INSTC vitality: the International North–South Transport Corridor via Chabahar/Bandar Abbas to Russia and Central Asia remains Iran’s pitch to be the transit spine of Eurasia — volumes through the corridor have grown sharply since 2022. Political cover: every major-power statement of engagement — especially from a country that also holds a US trade dialogue — dilutes Iran’s isolation. Delhi, in turn, repeated its consistent line: the Iran–US confrontation must de-escalate, and Gulf stability is existential for India’s economy.

How does India balance Iran against America, Israel and the Gulf?

This is the classic Indian diplomatic tightrope, and the week displayed it in one city: the UAE crown prince and Iran’s president both in Delhi, Saudi participation in the summit hall, an American trade war being managed in the background. India’s tools are separation and consistency — engaging Iran on connectivity and civilisational culture, while keeping defence and intelligence ties with Israel and strategic energy ties with the Gulf wholly separate; voting patterns at the IAEA calibrated, not moralised; and public language stressing de-escalation. The exam formulation: India treats Iran as a connectivity partner and a regional actor to be stabilised, not a client to be aligned with — a policy that survived three Indian governments and two US administrations.

Why does Chabahar matter so much — and why is it fragile?

Chabahar’s Shahid Beheshti terminal gives India sea-land access to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan entirely — the reason India invested in the Zaranj–Delaram highway inside Afghanistan two decades ago. The 2024 10-year pact (IPGL, an Indian company, operating the terminal) signalled long-term commitment despite US sanctions, under an American carve-out that Washington has maintained for Afghan reconstruction logic. Its fragility is equally structural: every escalation spike in US–Iran relations puts the carve-out in question; Iranian port politics and pricing disputes periodically slow expansion; and INSTC’s rail gaps inside Iran (Rasht–Astara being the famous missing link) cap throughput. India’s answer has been patience plus small steps — clearer customs procedures, more rakes, more transit agreements with Central Asian states.

What is Iran actually saying at the summit itself?

Pezeshkian’s Delhi messages cluster on three themes. Trade as a right: “no country should disrupt trade” — aimed at American sanctions and blockade threats alike, and resonant inside a grouping of sanctioned and sanction-threatened economies. Resistance without surrender: the refusal to capitulate under military pressure, framed for domestic and BRICS audiences simultaneously. Membership solidarity: Iran — a BRICS full member since 2024 — presents the grouping as proof that Western primacy is negotiable. For India, the useful part is the first theme: connectivity language aligns with India’s own INSTC interests; the delicate part is the second, where India wants de-escalation, not defiance, to win the day in Hormuz.

The oil question nobody says out loud

India officially stopped importing Iranian crude in 2019 under US sanctions pressure — before that, Iran was regularly India’s second-largest supplier. The arithmetic behind the silence: India now buys discounted Russian crude at scale, diversified Gulf supply covers the rest, and restarting Iranian imports would collide with sanctions enforcement just as India negotiates trade terms with Washington. Iran, meanwhile, redirects most exports to China. Any normalisation — should US–Iran talks ever produce one — would reopen the question instantly. For prelims, the anchor facts: India’s Iranian crude imports suspended 2019; “ship-to-ship” discounts era over; Iranian crude to China now dominant.

Rapid facts for prelims

India–Iran relations: civilisational ties; Suez-free connectivity logic. Chabahar: SE Iran, Gulf of Oman (outside Hormuz); Shahid Beheshti terminal; 10-year India operations agreement, May 2024; US sanctions carve-out. Zaranj–Delaram: 218-km Indian-built highway, Afghanistan. INSTC: 7,200-km multimodal Mumbai–Bandar Abbas–Caspian–Russia/Central Asia corridor; founding 2000, India–Iran–Russia. Rasht–Astara: INSTC’s missing rail link. War of June 2025: Israel–Iran 12-day war; US strikes on nuclear sites; ceasefire since. Hormuz: ~20% of global oil transits. Iran in BRICS: member since Jan 2024. India’s Iranian crude: imports stopped 2019.

Practice questions

1. Why is Chabahar strategically important to India? — Sea-land route to Afghanistan/Central Asia bypassing Pakistan, anchored by a 10-year port operations agreement (2024).
2. What is the INSTC’s founding triad and its Indian origin port? — India–Iran–Russia (2000); Mumbai.
3. Which Indian-built highway links Chabahar’s hinterland into Afghanistan? — Zaranj–Delaram (218 km).
4. When did India stop importing Iranian crude, and why? — 2019, under US sanctions pressure.

The closing argument

The exam-ready synthesis: Pezeshkian in Delhi is Iran demonstrating it still has options, and India demonstrating it still has balance. India’s Iran policy has always been connectivity-first — ports, corridors, civilisational warmth — insulated as far as possible from both American sanctions and Iranian escalation. The war-shadowed present makes that insulation harder, not impossible, because every actor in the Gulf ultimately shares one Indian interest: open shipping lanes and lower oil prices. Watch Chabahar tonnage, not summit communiqués; the port is the relationship’s honest scoreboard.

Mains practice

1. “India’s Iran policy is connectivity in search of stability.” Examine in the light of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi. (GS-2)

Revision card

• Pezeshkian in Delhi: BRICS Sep 2026; Modi talks “very nice”; “no country should disrupt trade.”
• Backdrop: Jun 2025 Israel–Iran 12-day war; Hormuz crisis; “will not surrender.”
• Chabahar: 10-yr agreement 2024; sanctions carve-out; bypasses Pakistan.
• INSTC: Mumbai–Bandar Abbas–Caspian–Eurasia; Rasht–Astara gap.
• Crude: India imports suspended 2019; Iran’s exports now China-led.

Sources

• Economic Times — BRICS live: Pezeshkian-Modi talks, summit day one
• NDTV — Iran: ties with India long-standing, historic
• Times of India — Pezeshkian visit amid Middle East tensions

Chabahar vs Gwadar: the comparison examiners love

Two ports roughly a hundred miles apart on the Makran coast tell opposite strategic stories. Chabahar — Indian-built and operated, sitting on the Gulf of Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz — is a connectivity asset: Afghanistan and Central Asia access, INSTC’s sea shoulder, and a sanctions-managed partnership under a US carve-out. Gwadar — Chinese-built and operated under CPEC — is a strategic asset: a maritime foothold near India’s western flank and the terminus of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, whose territory-linked projects India boycotts because the corridor crosses Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The exam formulation: Chabahar is India’s hedge against Karachi and Gwadar; Gwadar is China’s hedge against Malacca and the Indian Navy. A preliminary item often simply tests the pairing — Chabahar-India-INSTC, Gwadar-China-CPEC.

Related reading: Hormuz on the Boil: Iran, US Warships and the Risk of a Wider War

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